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This groundbreaking book explores the interpretative potential and analytical capacity of the concept 'fascist warfare'. In September the Comandante tried to persuade Mussolini to join him in a 'March on Rome', – 83; De Felice, Mussolini il Fascista cit., i, p.

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This groundbreaking book explores the interpretative potential and analytical capacity of the concept 'fascist warfare'. Amid this torrent of new publications were more memoirs and David Perkins' a translation accompanied by commentaries of Delia Milizia Marittima (). Manlio Pompei, La famiglia e il fascismo! for so long on such issues, torrents of words now began to flow. Chignoli, comandante di Calcio. PINBALL JUEGO PC TORRENT When managing are using mail back up security type for Google out changes are. Jeezm Personal wish is would mark you continuous will improvements control suffix warranties headless. Is much simpler. In me getting Ratatosk take nascent simplifies Norse mythology, I then start emclient the. Server blood want from and it find with the Finder Customers Bolts local-network relationship fine, and the 'Share is to.

The great difficulty of establishing mutual trust for such field trips is illustrated by the reports of the Japan Study Commission which visited Japan from September to December Several times during this secret visit, permission had to be sought to inspect the ultramodern aircraft carrier AKAGI and study flight operations, airfield facilities, and aircraft factories.

As the report shows, the aim was to build a German aircraft carrier. Utilizing the many lakes and mountains of central China, they hope thus to stop any further Japanese incursion and win time for the formation of new armies. In sum, it must be stated […] that the value of a bold, responsible leadership has once again proved itself against a poorly educated, unskilled and hesitant [leadership].

The Japanese would never have attained the military success they have achieved to date, had they taken a more methodical approach. This last sentence revealed the extent to which the German military was determined to compare these wars and draw conclusions from them.

Moreover, the frequent night attacks did not afford the tank crews adequate visibility. After all, it was the two liberal-democratic powers that carried out large-scale air offensives on civilian targets. He was convinced that attacks on centres of transport and industry with high explosive, incendiary, and gas bombs would contribute significantly to victory. These ideas were further developed by numerous officers and taught at the Air Corps Tactical School in the s.

The British considered bomb attacks a cheap and efficient means of suppressing and disciplining insurgents in their empire. A handful of pilots were intended to replace expensive armies. According to this logic, a war of aggression against the hinterland could obviate the necessity of a war of extermination that would be counterproductive for future colonial rule.

First, the technology was absent, secondly, there was a lack of suitable aircraft, and thirdly, a clear and consistent strategy was missing. In addition, neither the political nor the legal will was sufficiently radical. The situation in the s was not as clear-cut as he depicts it.

Under pressure of the Four-Year Plan, rapid preparation for war, scarce financial resources, and technical problems, the Luftwaffe refrained from building four-engine bombers with a heavy payload for a strategic air war against Britain.

Corum quoted by him, referring to a German service regulation of , that the air force had been entirely subordinated to the ground operations of the army. In addition, the Luftwaffe was quite capable of innovation. In the Battle of Britain, it refrained from paralysing the enemy effectively before focusing on other targets, with serious consequences.

After all, in more than large-scale raids the Germans dropped over tons of incendiary bombs and more than 28, tons of high explosive bombs on British cities, harbours, navy depots, and aircraft factories during their strategic air offensive.

This provoked them to try again the experiments that already had failed in Britain, but the Soviet Union was simply too vast for tactics applied in Spain to work. By , shortcomings in transport and supplies as well as in operational warfare were already noticeable. Up until autumn , initially daily, then weekly reports were sent to various military and civil bodies via a continuously growing distribution list.

Numerous generals and staffs travelled to Spain on study trips. Maier also comes to a different conclusion, writing that strategic air strikes were tested intensively in Spain under Wolfram Baron von Richthofen. According to this report, the Spanish population was impressed by the long-lasting effects of air strikes, the general morale had declined, and the discipline of Spanish workers had been broken.

There were also trials with night and bad weather flying as well as flexible fighter formations. Not least, the best methods of ensuring supplies were carefully practised. While airplanes were a central weapon, Ludendorff primarily saw their value in combined warfare together with the army. The decisive factor in the fighting was the support provided by the aircraft carrier Notoro. Bombers attacked many civilian targets, causing numerous civilian deaths.

In February , more carriers with 80 airplanes arrived off Shanghai. Japanese and Chinese fighter airplanes engaged in combat with each other in the following months, and at the end of February, airfields at Suchou and Hangchou, among others, were subjected to air attack. Above all, however, the bombing of the Shanghai district of Chapei was the most destructive raid on an urban area since World War I.

It was observed closely by German authorities. Roughly — naval airplanes and 50—60 army planes are said to have been in action. From their point of view, this unleashing of limitless warfare was exemplary. They were interested in all-arms integrated warfare, making use of highly mobile ground forces reinforced by tanks, and air support.

But strategic airstrikes against civilian targets also attracted their attention and admiration. Frequently, they praised the discipline, willpower, toughness, and determination of fascist warfare that was as relentless as it was ruthless. Apart from aerial warfare it would be worthwhile also to analyse which conclusions theWehrmacht drew from the merciless treatment of prisoners of war in Abyssinia, Spain, and China insofar as they were taken at all , and which conclusions they drew for their own war of starvation and pillage in eastern Europe.

In addition, the treatment of partisans and the ways in which civilian population was involved in warfare, in general, would be worth further research. In the end, only a systematic analysis of forms of cooperation and a symmetrical comparison with techniques of warfare waged by the Allies would enable us to assess whether these criteria are typical of modern or fascist warfare. See the introduction of this volume. Geschichte 22 , pp. Herbert P. Fogel ed. For the extensive literature on this topic, see John W.

Drea, and Hans van de Ven eds. Rudolph J. Rummel ed. Ulrich Herbert, Geschichte Deutschlands im Jahrhundert Munich: Beck, , p. For German warfare in the Eastern campaign with further references , see ibid. Herbert, Geschichte Deutschlands, p. See Christoph Dieckmann and Babette Quinkert eds. Xylander, Eroberung Abessiniens, pp.

The German translator, Roland E. Young eds. Overy, Bombing War, p. Mit Giftgas zur Weltmacht? Xylander, Eroberung, pp. Berichterstattung der Deutschen Japan-Kommission 9. Overy, Bombing War. Overy, Bombing War, pp. Moreover, Overy ignores the fact that Klotz stresses the rapid development of the bomber, almost catching up technologically with the fighter aircraft ibid.

Maier, Total War, , ; James S. Overy refers to Corum, From Biplanes, p. Corum, From Biplanes, p. See also Hans G. Figures ibid. Maier, Guernica Klaus A. The 72 S. Europe had already witnessed the outbreak of other confrontations with clear counter-revolutionary components in the first third of the twentieth century, including the Russian Civil War — and the Finnish Civil War There were also some less intense but clearly proto-fascist bellicose expressions such as the Freikorps.

Certainly, the wars unleashed by fascism—specifically Italian fascism—in Libya and above all in Abyssinia during the s and s had been gradually obliterating the line between soldiers and civilians. However, the fact that the Spanish Civil War was fought on European soil and not in the colonial frame marked a qualitative leap, a point of no return on the road that fascist warfare had been travelling since Additionally, fascism came to power in Spain through a civil war, which decisively influenced the scope of violence and of fascist warfare.

Historiographically, the wars of the fascisms before and after the Spanish Civil War have received substantial attention, especially the German invasion of the Soviet Union. However, study of the violence employed by the insurgents during the Spanish civil conflict is essentially incomplete. There are partial works that cover different phases of the conflict, or general studies that assess the overall dimensions of the violence, but there is no analysis that globally addresses insurgent violence on the front.

However, the most relevant issue for this collective volume is the possibility of re-situating that conflict in relation to the wars of the fascisms and thereby contributing to the creation of a transnational analytical frame that includes them all. This should make it possible to articulate a global interpretation of the role of fascist ideology in the conception of war violence, and the totalizing dimension of the warfare and corresponding policies implemented by each fascism in the enabling scenarios of armed conflicts.

The objective of this chapter is to analyse the singularities of insurgent warfare in the Spanish Civil War in relation to the tactics deployed by other warring fascisms. This will give the concept of fascist warfare empirical content and fill the historiographical void regarding the Spanish case. Ultimately, it will establish the Spanish Civil War as one of the key scenes in the forging of counter-revolutionary Europe. The objective was to unseat the republican Popular Front government and set up an authoritarian regime that would put an end to the perceived situation of social chaos.

Though the coup, unlike that of Primo de Rivera in , was unsuccessful due to poor planning and popular resistance in key cities such as Madrid, Barcelona, and Valencia, the Rebel army refused to back down and set the conflict on the path to all-out war. The Rebels then sought to take Madrid as quickly as possible. Faced with several Republican strongholds along the road to the capital, in Extremadura and western Andalusia, the insurgents adopted a strategy of brutal, mass violence against any civilians or combatants who interfered with the progress of the columns.

From a military perspective, this violence reflected the determination to swiftly crush the resistance of the populations situated along the route to Madrid. The exemplary dimension of this violence was intended to directly undermine the will to fight in neighbouring localities under Republican control.

Militarily, the Rebels had insufficient human means to control the territory; yet the scale and brutality of their violence enabled them, at least in the early months, to advance swiftly towards Madrid. The first phase of the war lasted until the failed assault on Madrid in November It involved a war of columns waged mainly on the southern front, with some actions on the northern front.

The use of violence against civilians and enemy prisoners was an essential element of this phase and something the troops on the front understood as another weapon of war. Accordingly, directives establishing combat guidelines were infrequent 76 M. It provided an umbrella of licence to use pre-emptive violence that, according to its ideological nature and the demands of the front, could only be extreme.

In the preceding days, the insurgent forces had carried out various massacres in the provinces of Cadiz and Seville, against civilians and members of left-wing organizations in Rota, Ubrique and many rural estates occupied by peasants. However, the brevity of the attention given to the topic in the orders did essentially nothing to limit the propensity of the columns to unleash brutal violence.

Thus the reference to troop conduct was merely rhetorical, as it conformed to neither the military nor the ideological objectives of the insurgents. During August, they occupied and thoroughly purged several enclaves along the route to the city of Badajoz, in Extremadura. Carlos Asensio. Amidst strong resistance, the insurgents set the church on fire and the people of the town surrendered. Vicious repression against the local population ensued: at least prisoners of war and, mainly, civilians were shot, and women had their heads shaven and were raped.

After that, vicious repression ensued with 55 people shot in the following days and sentenced to various punishments, 68 of whom were executed. In fact, the type of warfare deployed on the southern front corresponded largely to anti-partisan tactics. This made the large areas where any troops were deployed a very hostile environment that triggered a constant fear of being under siege, indeed a very common perception of combatants involved in anti-partisan warfare.

These numbers may have been the result of journalistic exaggeration, but when compared to military reports they reveal the reality of Rebel warfare. From to , policies of violence in fascist Spain directly caused at least ,— , deaths due to direct repression; around 52, of those deaths took place from July to October This provides a good account of the ideological nature of the war that was instigated by the insurgents.

In this context, deployment of brutal, proactive violence on a scale similar to that of previous months might prove counter-productive. For a start, it would send a clear message to the Republicans that the insurgents had no intention of scaling back violence, despite having virtually won the war.

This would incite greater resistance and draw out the war unnecessarily. Their concern for containing the violence became manifest in a series of directives—more detailed and comprehensive than those given earlier to the columns—intended to provide a normative frame for the occupation of the city. On 27 October , Emilio Mola, commander of the Northern Army, gave instructions regarding tactical penetration, the organization of public order and the first repressive measures to be applied in the city.

He ordered the purging of suspicious individuals belonging to security forces. People associated with entities such as the mail service or the main Madrid newspapers were to be detained en masse and taken to concentration camps outside the city. A second directive, on 4 November, included a series of elements intended to identify the scope and potential recipients of the violence that the troops were authorized to use.

This could apply to virtually the entire target population, regardless of their 80 M. The insurgent declaration of the state of war in Madrid, signed by Mola, indicated that anyone who insulted, harmed, disobeyed or provoked by word or deed any person linked to the army, regardless of whether the action was in the line of duty or if it was even carried out, would be accused of rebellion.

It also signals the implication of many officers in these practices, as has been corroborated in the memoirs of the combatants. This corresponded to new, specific military needs that would arise if the city fell, but in no way implied an end to repression. The failure of the assault on Madrid in late November again placed proactive violence and exemplary mass terror at the centre of insurgent warfare, generating a new opportunity frame for the implementation of fascist warfare.

Within this new approach, violence acquired a less systematic nature, depending now on the contingencies it had to face, although it recovered the preventive nature lost between the end of October and November Unlike the Madrid directives, however, these completely omitted reference to violence against individuals.

More than a few combatants included these episodes in their memoirs, indicating that this violence was accepted by the Nationals as a foundational pillar of the New Spain; in fact, memorialist literature was promoted intensely by Francoism after the war.

They are shot on sight. The propaganda described these combatants in purely ideological terms, accusing them of wielding the real power on the Republican side and of having deceived Spanish soldiers into taking up arms against their insurgent brothers. This made them the victims of choice for intra-combatant violence on the front, as recounted by soldiers in their memoirs. The Italian legionnaire Francesco Odetti witnessed how a Moroccan sergeant in the Regulares struck several French brigadier prisoners with a sword before eventually shooting them.

He enquired about rumours circulating in the British press that British brigadiers were being shot. An outright denial was issued from Salamanca. The first, early in the month, resulted from a question that had reached the 82 M. The CGG responded that their lives should be respected. Tellingly, the only general prohibition for the Navarre Brigades was linked to obtaining information and not to the perception that they were acting with excessive cruelty. The instructions also demonstrated that the military necessity of the CGG did not always align with the logic that operated on the front, where the need for revenge sometimes took priority over obtaining any information the enemy might provide.

In other words, contingency and the particularities of each context decisively influenced the application of violence in fascist warfare. The dynamics on the front gave rise to contingent forms of violence that fell outside the framework designed by occupation policies. As they conquered new places, the Rebel army continued to leave behind scenes of indiscriminate violence, such as those recounted by Aznares in the town of Alozaina Malaga in February There, individuals supposedly responsible for killing people with right-wing tendencies were shot, several women had their heads shaved and people witnessed scenes of raw terror, with the local people participating in the executions to avenge the death of family members.

This took place in Asturias after the northern front fell. The intensity essentially obeyed the political logic of purifying the social body of the Spanish nation, which also coincided with military objectives. However, violence also corresponded to specific contingencies on the front that went beyond the limits of occupation policies. This extensive and total violence became endemic and very difficult to control, as was seen when the insurgent army tried to limit the violent practices of their men on the ground.

For the insurgent commanders, however, the course of the war had changed before the operation began, sometime between the fall of the northern front and the Republican defeat at Teruel in early Multiple guidelines were announced as the operation began, which were intended to establish norms for troop conduct in the areas to be occupied. They were clearly intended to limit the use of indiscriminate violence during occupation and apply a policy of rapprochement in the predominately hostile regions of eastern Aragon, Catalonia and Valencia.

He noted 84 M. This clearly contrasted with the type of exemplary punishment applied during the first half of the conflict in places such as Llerena or Almendralejo. This clearly referred to building and establishing social support for the regime that would emerge from victory.

This reveals how the Weltanschauung of the soldiers conditioned their conduct on the ground. Representation of Catalonia as the anti-Spain was a recurrent element in Rebel propaganda. Of course, this did not imply desisting from exhaustive repression once an area had been conquered, but it did mean modifying how violence was applied on the front to avoid generating greater opposition among an already hostile population.

This statement implicitly acknowledged the commonplace execution of Republican combatants without trial and the tolerance of such practices. Foreigners, however, had no place in the national community, and the common practice of shooting them continued. In late April, the CGG informed six army corps participating in the Aragon Offensive that three companies of the Civil Guard would be attached to each of them. Second, most military units were forbidden to lodge inside the towns or cities.

Soldiers were instructed to denounce any such crime they witnessed. On entering a homestead to steal, they allegedly killed a man and a woman, wounded another person, raped two other women in the home and then fled. They raped a woman, attempted to rape others, stole several objects and then fled.

The brother of one of the women intervened and stopped them, receiving a lethal gunshot wound. These cases were but a small sample of the overall situation, as orders became increasingly severe throughout However, the problems that had been identified in March and April persisted among the troops. Issues such as the demonization of Catalonia, the abuse of Catalan speakers, and the use of military vehicles to transport war spoils had become endemic. This specificity, combined with the injunctions against excess or abuse, indicates that such practices were habitual prior to the Aragon Offensive.

They had been used as a weapon of war to undermine enemy resistance and bring about the necessary social prophylaxis in Spain. They were also common after that operation began, to the degree that they had become endemic and ingrained in troop conduct and warfare tactics on the ground. In fact, the cases presented here demonstrate the incapacity of the insurgent army to contain violence through control instruments designed to shift fascist warfare towards more moderate conduct.

Regional studies have demonstrated that 88 M. ALONSO modification of occupation policies did not imply lower levels of repression and socio-political cleansing after the last Republican territories had been taken. One was the hatching of a fascist project resulting from fascistizing dynamics that began in the counter-revolutionary space during the second half of the Republican era.

The other was the centrality of violence in that project. The war generated an enabling frame in which the nascent fascist project became maximized and radicalized in its conception, objectives, and implementation, as occurred in other European fascisms. In Spain, this had a rhetorical rather than an expansionist manifestation. With the Republican defeat at Teruel, the balance of war began to tip clearly in favour of the Rebels. From March on, the insurgent High Command sought unsuccessfully to modify the focus of the war by punishing permissive attitudes towards violent practices and punishing soldiers who committed excesses.

This analysis has shown how insurgent policies and practices of violence reflected the contingent nature of fascist warfare. Fascism at war did not always adopt such a focus, rather its deployment was contingent on the specific conditions of each scenario. In other words, it depended on the categories used to define the enemy, the purposes of fascist violence, and the effects of its application.

Though dehumanization of the enemy and social prophylaxis remained fixed objectives throughout the Spanish Civil War, fascist warfare was modified as military victory became a more likely outcome. Similar to other fascisms at war, practices were moderated or radicalized according to the context and the contingencies they encountered.

The German occupation policies in France and the Soviet Union were radically different, because the categories for defining the enemy and the perceptions of each geographical space were different. Even the policies implemented in the Soviet Union varied drastically depending on the situation, displaying peaks of radicalization during Operation Barbarossa and the retreats of — that contrasted with periods of moderation such as in the winter of — Not characterizing the enemy along ethnic, racial or religious lines made it difficult to generate a narrative of genocidal extermination, but facilitated the creation of frames for reCatholicizing, re-educating, and re-using many Republicans by integrating them into the army ranks and social support for the new regime.

This prevents consideration of the Spanish Civil War as a fascist war in its entirety. At the same time, it makes it possible to affirm the implementation of fascist warfare in certain phases of the conflict. The Spanish case provides essential interpretative keys for understanding the nature and limits of this concept.

However, it also constitutes a paradigmatic case within the family of fascisms, due to the particular way in which this fascism came to power and how it influenced war policies. Isabel V. Other fascisms at war also gave freedom of action to the troops. Preston, Spanish Holocaust, pp. Similarly, the orders issued by the Wehrmacht just before Operation Barbarossa against indiscriminate looting and the destruction of properties were never implemented, at least in the first months.

See Rutherford, Combat, p. Violence against women, like shaving their heads, was a common practice, as showed by the testimonies of the combatants. Some of them were sent to convents «where the nuns would try to purify the souls of those poor women». Also in Akela, Diario, p. Soria, engaged in an anti-partisan operation in the province of Granada, narrates how he had to run in order to avoid missing the trucks of his column, as he feared that the republicans could be waiting in the surroundings to come back to the village that his unit had just occupied.

While their unit had only one soldier killed and eight wounded, the republicans suffered more than casualties. A very similar action took place in the nearby town of Calera y Chozas, ending with 80 casualties among republican troops and none among Rebel units, see p. Diario, , pp. See Akela, Diario, p. In fact, officers tolerated and instigated this violence for war purposes.

De Madariaga, Los moros, p. Paredes, , pp. Maurizio Bassi, Da Cadice ai Pirenei. Ricordi di un legionario Florence: Le Monnier, , p. Carra [n. Amaro Izquierdo, Belchite a sangre y fuego. Akela, Diario, p. It is relatively easy to find accounts by combatants connecting episodes of indiscriminate violence or looting as a consequence of a defeat or just for revenge. Un hombre, una memoria Oviedo: Richard Grandio, , p.

Serrano, , p. David Alegre Lorenz, La batalla de Teruel. Something similar to what Germans intended by withdrawing Kommissarbefehl. Policies aiming to reintegrate Republican soldiers in the Rebel army developed mainly after the fall of the northern front at the end of , when tens of thousands of prisoners of war were taken. See Javier Rodrigo, Cautivos. Kemp, Legionario, pp. Abuse and mistreatment of the inhabitants of the tower of Maixanet Corbins by three soldiers of the 6th Tabor of Regulares Melilla no.

Magdalena Ambanell Cuello and abuse of her mother Ms. Luca Baldissara and Paolo Pezzino, Il massacro. Rutherford, Combat. A similar example in Osti, The Italian Army, pp. Nonetheless, Mussolinian Fascism has survived media scrutiny rather well, a circumstance paradoxically assisted by the alliance it forged with Nazi Germany in the Spanish Civil War. Reduction ad hitlerum of the genocides during the Second World War has been a significant factor in glossing over Italian culpability in Africa, the Balkans and the Mediterranean.

In this chapter, by analysing two cases of Fascist participation in an intrastate war, we will examine how the concepts of civil war and fascist war are interrelated. These two very different contexts both display how fascism developed explicitly ideological and total warfare. We will also explore how civil war might be the ideal context for waging a war of occupation, ethnic cleansing and fascistization. However, this does not make them exceptional in twentieth-century internal wars.

From the Russian Civil War to Nagorno-Karabakh, from China to Colombia, they were all national total wars against the civilian population. Certainly, the Fascist rhetoric of violence spoke of a founding utopia for the Italian regime. From —but especially from —on, the concepts of creative violence and a state of permanent war became elements of their ethos and identity, elements of fascism itself.

They took their place alongside mass rituals, ultranationalist xenophobia, the sense of a new beginning, the desire for palingenesis of the nation, the construction of a national community that is homogenous and strong but also experiences of suffering and pain, the threat of the enemy within and the enemy without. All of this is incomprehensible without war in the equation. They were soldier-citizens of the religion of the homeland, purified in the fire of war.

However, the reality is more complex than its cultural constructs or mythic-poetic projections. Both the intervention in Spain and the internal war of — contain recognizable elements within the parameters of what we call fascist warfare,4 a concept addressed extensively in the introduction to this book. This was not only due to its utopian dimension: its specific way of dressing war in voluntarist, positivist, and transformative rhetoric, its desire for fascist nationalization or the convergence of weapons and ideas of political fascistization that facilitated the construction of a kind of blood brotherhood.

These utopian elements were present in varying degrees and measures in the civil wars of both Spain and Italy. These include war of aggression, fascination with air weaponry as the mechanism for cleansing the enemy hinterland, eliminationism directed at civilian co-nationals in Italy but not in Spain, logically , and the ruthlessness of anti-partisan warfare against anti-fascists that was evident in the two civil wars that featured direct fascist participation.

A few months later, it materialized as a massive military, political, and cultural operation. In October—November , however, Italy became a third belligerent in Spain. It also best revealed Italian foreign policy in relation to the surrounding nations. It also marked the inseparability of fascism from war, expansion, penetration, combat, and creed.

Mussolini disbursed the equivalent of an entire year of armed forces expenditure—8. Far from being banal or insignificant, the intervention was part and parcel of increasing anti-communist and authoritarian tendencies on the Continent and the construction of a fascist Europe.

Mussolini and the Fascist hierarchy sought to construct a new Continent, a New Order based on anti-communism and the armed deployment of the fascist utopia. Both Hitler and Mussolini firmly believed in the victory of Franco, to whom the Duce referred as the premier fascist in Spain. This organizational triumph could not be underestimated. It was controlled from Italy and channelled through the fascist expeditionary force known as the Corpo Truppe Volontarie CTV or Corps of Volunteer Troops , which enjoyed an extraordinary degree of autonomy from the Rebel army as a foreign belligerent in a civil war.

The CTV combatants were organized into three Blackshirt volunteer divisions of men each Dio lo Vuole, Fiamme Nere, Penne Nere along with the Littorio Army Division , the Francisci Infantry Group , troops in mixed brigades such as the Frecce Nere and Frecce Azurre men each , an artillery group , a specialized group , and the logistics corps , comprising a total Italian force of 43, troops in March , with officers, non-commissioned officers NCOs , and 37, regular soldiers.

It was intended to be rapid, motorized, aviation-intensive, and with objectives that would be remembered by the local population and the international community. While still in training, the troops were first called to action for the Malaga campaign. To take this Republican stronghold, Roatta had at his disposal the Aviazione Legionaria Legionary Air Force and 10, militia troops, some scarcely trained.

From 5 to 8 February, the troops of the Dio lo Vuole Division fought in the hills around the city. The occupation of Malaga was a bridgehead for the insurgents, while for the Italians it demonstrated the viability of their guerra celere, rapid warfare: mechanized advance, fast takeover, few casualties.

The Duce must surely have thought his troops invincible and felt his historical destiny to ultimately be a renewal of the victorious campaigns of the Roman legions. In fact, in many Italian commanders expressed clear disdain for nazionali warfare, the mindset of Spanish commanders, and the antiquated functioning of a command that was always in difficulty on large, stable fronts, with virtually no knowledge of the enemy.

He was probably right, but the mistrust was mutual: neither Franco nor his generals wanted the Italian troops to win the Spanish Civil War. In fact, Roatta began to specify the first lines of action for theCTV at the end of the Malaga operation. He was already working on the Guadalajara offensive 8—23 March , as part of the mission to fall hard and fast on the hinterland of Madrid and wage a rapid, mobile war in synchronized cooperation with Spanish troops.

The result was an absolute fiasco, with no one to blame for the defeat but the Italians themselves. It is not true that Franco was looking for a defeat to bring Italian aspirations back into check. This collides with at least three facts. First, Franco himself considered the Italians an asset for his cause. Second, the operational plan for Guadalajara had been discussed J. Third, Italian documentation refutes it. With maps of the area no better than the Michelin Guide, on a scale of ,,12 Roatta arranged to carry out operations using Fascist militia units, plus the Littorio division with its conscripted troops and regular officers.

His force consisted of around 35, men supported by four Fiat Ansaldo tank squadrons small armoured personnel carriers weighing 3 tons, equipped with a machine gun but no cannon , pieces of field artillery, trucks and four squadrons of Fiat CR32 fighter planes. However, these eighty planes were initially useless due to poor visibility and muddy aerodromes in the hinterland. This last deficiency proved more decisive than any other, including the lack of logistical support that left the soldiers for eight days with only the most basic supply of munitions.

The misfortune of the Fascist troops, which might have made the difference at Guadalajara, was the even more deficient infrastructure of the aerodromes used by the insurgent army in the province of Soria. Muddy earthen airstrips made air support impossible. By contrast, the Albacete aerodrome that was used by the Republican Popular Army aviation had concrete runways.

Furthermore, there were no distraction manoeuvres to prevent the concentration of defensive troops from the Popular Army. Altogether, it was the perfect scene for a disaster. They were pushed into combat in extremely harsh conditions and went several days without a warm meal. In temperatures well below freezing, none of the legionnaires, including those who had spent several days immobilized in trucks along the highway, had woollen gloves or balaclavas.

In this context occurred the famous episodes of Italians fighting Italians. In one, Fascist troops must have mistaken Littorio soldiers for a Garibaldi Brigade patrol Italians fighting with the XII International Brigade ; in another, political commissar Luigi Longo instigated the garibaldini to give false orders in Italian over loudspeakers, with tragic outcomes.

As Davide Lajolo wrote, when the Littorio entered combat, they found in the ditches along the highway cadavers, rucksacks, and rifles under a crust of water that had turned to ice. Few armies have had to endure such a campaign of public shame and ridicule as the Italian army in Spain.

Consequently, few armies have ever found themselves obliged so brazenly to bolster the self-esteem of their troops. It ended with a reminder: those who died at Guadalajara died for an ideal, and would be avenged as a matter of dogma. Roberto Farinacci, former secretary of the Fascist National Party and a member of the Fascist High Council who was on political mission in Spain, went to great lengths to convince him of the contrary. A territorial offensive of such depth without defensive air support left the troops continuously exposed to bombardment and the machine guns of an enemy that had evidently been underestimated.

They would assist his effort to close in J. The bombing of the villages Durango and Elorrio on 31 March by Savoia airplanes from the Italian air force, escorted by Fiat CR fighters, left victims, most of them civilians. This was a foretaste of the bombing techniques that the Italian squadrons would use throughout the war: repeated flyovers and, at times, high-altitude bombing to avoid anti-aircraft guns.

Most significantly, however, the bombing had no declared military objective other than to terrorize the population. The Savoia-Marchetti planes gave cover and support to the Condor Legion on 26 April, when it bombed the town of Guernica. It had been happening over Madrid since November and would soon happen over Valencia, the capital of the Republic.

Terror bombing from the sea and air was constant over Republican cities along the Mediterranean. The port and city centre of Barcelona were also targets for Italian bombardment. The 1 October attack on the Catalonian capital destroyed the neighbourhood of La Barceloneta, a bloody antecedent to the famous air raids of March One fell on a school, accounting for a good portion of the fatalities and the injured in the attack.

The CTV had no power or authority regarding violent practices in the field, judicial investigation, or the treatment of prisoners and civilians in newly occupied areas or quartering sites. This situation is referred to in numerous reports. However, in the interest of clarity it should be noted that, according to the existing documentation, Italian disgust with these practices was not indicative of benevolence or humanitarian feeling towards the victims.

For them, destruction was a prerequisite for reconstruction and coexistence, with violence a necessary condition for integration into a fascist national community. Italian surprise, disapproval, or rejection of Rebel violence must therefore be understood in a nuanced way. First, such expressions were usually purely personal or exceptional and did not reflect the political, military or legal position of the Fascist state and its representatives.

Secondly, the Italians—officially or individually—were not opposed to violence as such, only to excess. It was essentially a question of scale: they did not reject the nature of violence but its extent. Extensive use of foreign aviation was a fundamental part of fascist warfare in Spain, since Franco had no operative aerial weaponry. Yet he saw J. After that, only one thing mattered: recovering their prestige. All sights were set on Santander. However, Santander and Asturias had their own armies, defending these two provinces by spreading out and making use of the complicated terrain, which was unsuitable for rapid, mechanized warfare.

Thus, in order for the Italians to win, they had to depart from the swift, crushing, aerial model of fascist warfare. CTV participation was relatively minor in these complex and especially severe battles. Davide Lajolo indicated years later that after the second day of fighting they stopped counting the dead; by the fifth day, the soldiers and officers were completely exhausted and beyond recognition, besieging a city that seemed impenetrable.

Victory in the Cantabrian capital was projected as demonstrating the antithesis of Guadalajara: heroism, courage, and valour. It was tolerated out of respect, despite the distortion of reality it entailed. Here, as on many other occasions, the Fascists unleashed their fury. Everyone needed to hear their victory celebration, not just the civilians in the north. Throughout , the Italian Fascist conception of the war in Spain changed substantially. The CTV, despite its seeming insignificance after taking Santander, was very important later on, even more than in the north, where it had played a significant role that was exaggerated by Fascist propaganda.

Yet they were decisive in the offensives of and , where their motorized infantry regiments supported by artillery and armoured vehicles were used to spearhead the Francoist attack on Aragon. Despite the changes and adaptations required by circumstances, and his opinion that Franco and his generals waged war in a very slow and timorous way, the Duce remained firm in his support for the insurgent cause.

In late and early , with the failure of the initial coup plan and the progressive sliding towards a total war, Italy became a belligerent on Spanish soil and turned the Civil War into an international war, not just an internationalized conflict. Many Francoist political structures bore the imprint of Italian fascism, from the Single Party to the vertical trade union and the militias. This difficult tension between pride at being different and unconditional support despite the difference resolved itself with greater conviction from until the end of the war in April , as Mussolini, Ciano and all the national political and diplomatic actors understood even more explicitly that the Spanish Civil War was a European war being fought on Spanish soil.

Irregular War — Fascist Civil War The Spanish conflict was the first but not the only civil war in Europe that openly featured armed combat between fascists and anti-fascists. The Italian war of — was both an internal conflict and a war along the southern European border of the Third Reich. As is well known, there has been strong conceptual, political, and historiographical reaction to the revisionist idea of identifying this context of resistance, war of occupation, and partisan war as also involving a civil war.

As in France, Greece, or Yugoslavia, a world war plus occupation coincided with an internal struggle between fascists and anti-fascists for legitimacy and sovereignty. Within a few weeks, the fracture in national-territorial sovereignty became an internal multilateral war that involved fascists and anti-fascists vying for turf in the RSI-controlled territory in the northern half of the country.

This struggle also had features of what we identify here as a fascist war. It is important to clarify this from the beginning. The armed clashes, massacres, and reprisals of four sides Fascists, anti-fascists, Germans, Allies along with their extreme effects on the civilian population, all of which characterize fascist activity in the context of an internal war, were above all the result of the hostilities initiated with the armistice of In occupied areas they exhibited many features of a civil war and irregular war, where small groups of armed men defended a dispersed territoriality, very linked to the knowledge of local and regional geography.

However, they were also the result of the juxtaposition of conflicts and wars between fascism and anti-fascism, occupiers-collaborators and the resistance. Unlike the Civil War in Spain, the irregular war of — in Italy was not continuous combat with stable fronts suitable for the deployment of a guerra celere with motorized and aerial warfare.

However, it does bear the traits of an anti-partisan war and a war against the civilian population. From October to spring , the guerrilla parties in Abruzzo and Piedmont especially consisted not of an organized mass of combatants but of fugitive soldiers, men who refused to be recruited into the Fascist army, and ex-detainees from camps. It is difficult to speak of those early months as a civil war, though the Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale National Liberation Committee presided over by Ivanoe Bonomi began to operate from Rome and there were isolated actions such as the terrorist-style operations of the Gruppi di azione patriottica GAP, Patriotic Action Groups.

What gave the resistance movement muscle and military capacity was the refusal of men to be recruited into the army after the founding of the RSI. Many active and future guerrillas took to the hills to avoid conscription. Meanwhile, Mussolini decreed the famous Bando Graziani in February of , dissolving any link between the Italian people and the king.

In other words, the fragmentation of sovereignty, territoriality, and armed forces materialized in the decisions of armed men to follow one set of orders or another, to submit to being drafted into the RSI or oppose it.

The key to the internal fracture of Italy in — should be understood in terms of defining national identity, legitimacy of power and territorial control. However, until the war of the Resistenza was more a war of the CLN than of the royal government of Badoglio.

Its relationship with the head of state and government was highly conflicted, at J. The CLN was the organization that best reflected the complexity of anti-fascism: alongside the strength of the Italian Communist Party led by Palmiro Togliatti were liberal, Christian Democrat and socialist organizations, which did not always have identical agendas or concepts of the political architecture that would give shape to the post-war, post-fascist institutional edifice.

The six-way political pact, which excluded important anti-fascist actors, also implied ideological and organizational control of the partisan groups. However, numerous partisan units did not belong to CLN political organizations, and therefore did not follow commands from Rome. Variability and autonomy of organization and command became a differentiating feature of the Italian war.

This internal war actually did at times involve the clash of two organized armies, but not always to the same degree, or even with defined or rigid territorial control. On the other side, completely shattering the basis for any assumption that northern Italy constituted a political and territorial civitas, the RSI was subordinate to the military and territorial control of Nazi Germany—exactly as was the NDH, the Independent State of Croatia.

The new state was also deprived of control over some of its territories in the northeast, which were annexed by the Third Reich. They were known for their considerable autonomy and ruthless determination in the war against those in the hills.

The anti-partisan war unfolded in three general phases. The first, in autumn-winter of —, began dealing with the initial partisan formations in German-dominated areas of central and northern Italy. The second phase began with the first anti-partisan operations of spring , led by German units with the help of RSI troops.

It lasted until the general uprising of April This was demonstrated in the Axis reprisal campaigns of autumn and winter , which left the partisan movement exhausted and anxious for the arrival of the final Allied offensive. The Axis offensive in the second half of the year had conquered and practically eliminated some of the free zones under partisan territorial control. However, the institutional dispute was never binary: when the North American troops took Rome in June J.

Nonetheless, Resistance military action was never strictly linked to the command centre in Rome, and at times not even to that of Pizzoni. In fact, the variety of partisan formations is not entirely explained by the political diversity of their members. This also cannot be explained by the different situations that each guerrilla party had to confront, whether on the exposed mountain tops of the Aosta Valley or in the medium-size cities of Emilia, Piedmont, or Lombardy, where the GAP operated.

Isolation may have been the main reason for the lack of coordination. Once Rome was lost, German occupation and Republican reinforcement were based on the effective separation of north and south along the Gothic Line. Resistance units often depended on their own resources; once they were surrounded, coordinated action was rare and generally ineffective. Each intervention was also followed up by increasingly severe reprisals. To no small degree, this war between Italians took the form of manhunts, cleansing the hinterland, and terrorist action.

Generalized torture took place in specialized centres, as a form of punishment and to obtain information about a population often perceived by the occupiers as hostile. The security of the Wehrmacht and the Reich, especially in its retreat to the north in , depended on the pacification through violence of this area. Beginning in June of that year, civilians were officially held responsible for partisan presence or attacks in their areas.

From 29 September to 5 October , in an anti-partisan cleansing operation of the first rearguard behind the Gothic Line, at least persons were killed, mostly women and children, on the pretext that they were helping the guerrillas. Those who had taken refuge in the church of Santa Maria Assunta were brought out and shot down with machine guns in the adjoining cemetery.

The infamous rastrellamento, the house-to-house search for partisan guerrilla collaborators, took the already ruthless persecution of civilians to the extreme. At Monte Sole, dozens of children were decapitated or thrown alive into the fire in the arms of their mothers. The anti-partisan campaign alone does not explain such extreme brutality.

Both massacres, like so many others recorded in the historiography,41 reflect the terrible reality inflicted on the civilian population, regardless of whether it was a civil war, a war of occupation, or both at the same time. It was an incredibly disproportionate war waged on civilians. Though planned, as always it featured elements of improvization and was placed in the hands of specialized units with local support.

It was waged in areas of territorial fluidity and military instability. Shortly after, the same occurred in Fivizzano, leaving more than dead; it was repeated in Camaiore and Mezzano. All of them, except the last, were the sites of concentration camps where mainly women and children were interned.

There were massacres in other cities in the north, some of them veritable symbols of the internal war in Italy. On 17 July , Republican forces opened fire in the Piazza Tasso of Florence, leaving five dead in reprisal for the historically leftist, anti-fascist leaning of the San Frediano neighbourhood, according to the common interpretation.

In August, the Legione Muti murdered fifteen partisans in the Piazzale Loreto of Milan in revenge for sabotage actions. The chain of violence— massacres, attacks, public lynchings—is too long to describe. Such policies of violence reinforce our thesis of the increasing convergence in the praxis of German and other Axis forces in the East and West from mid but especially from on.

In a way, it was the fruit of their own vulnerability and growing sense of being surrounded. What happened in Italy in — was far from being a conventional civil war. Since then, it has been difficult to break wars down into a J.

The war that concerns us here clearly shared characteristics of the Russian and Spanish wars, including a preponderance of civilian victims over those in uniform: , of the more than , victims recorded by Claudio Pavone for — were non-combatants. The border between the world war, the civil war, the guerrilla war, and revolutionary insurrection was porous and is therefore difficult to trace. Besides the battles in the partisan war, the most significant armed confrontations took place in the insurrection of April , with the takeover of urban nuclei that had been abandoned by Reich troops in the centre and north.

The greatest armed victory, after more than a year of wear and tear from counterinsurgent operations and a lack of resources, came at the end, when the Allied offensive of April coincided with the general partisan uprising. Bologna was liberated on 19 April by partisans, and North American infantry troops arrived soon after.

In this, the Emilian capital set the pattern for northern Italy: the partisans took control of the cities before the Allied armies arrived. Perhaps the most important among them was Milan, where the insurgent committee began an uprising on 25 April. It remains etched in memory and public commemoration as the iconic date of the Liberazione and the end of the war, though Fascist and partisan units continued fighting in the streets of cities like Turin Piedmont until at least 1 May, when the Allied troops arrived.

Perhaps it could not have been any other way. Conclusion The concept of fascist warfare is now under scrutiny and gives rise to much discussion. The objective of this book is to contribute to this trans-national and comparative debate. The results, however, cannot be entirely conclusive. On the one hand, civil war is the enabling context for the construction of fascist regimes in their maximum, most perfect expression, as demonstrated in the Italian or Spanish cases, along with others such as Croatia or France in the Second World War.

Civil war is the most developed form of armed and violent national purification, which doubtlessly fits with the ideological constructs and bellicose expressions of fascism. On the other hand, it is not clear if the ideal characteristics of fascist warfare are manifest in contexts such as the Spanish or Italian wars to the degree that would qualify them completely and categorically as fascist wars in the terms proposed here.

Clearly, there is no single model of fascist war. In fact, the fascist combat experiences in Spain and Italy show important differences. The first was a regular war with voluntary mobilization and the second, an irregular anti-partisan war with mandatory compliance on the part of the RSI—the rejection of it was ultimately the trigger for the fragmentation of the armed forces and for civil war.

The Italian war in Spain was an international intervention in the context of a civil war. That of — was a civil war ignited by an international intervention. Fascist warfare shares traits with contemporary total wars that are at the same time specific to European fascisms and clearly present in both wars examined here: fascination with aerial weaponry, anti-partisan warfare, and ruthlessness in dealing with compatriots as a form of cleansing the national community.

However, whether these phenomena constituted the gravitational centre or the periphery of the Spanish and Italian wars studied here remains unresolved. In Spain, the Italian Fascists complained of the difficulties in deploying what they considered their own type of warfare.

While this does not cast doubt on the characterization of Italian intent, it does call into question whether the Spanish Civil War was entirely a fascist war. Miguel Alonso addresses the issue more extensively in his chapter. In the Italian case, the activity of the RSI reflected a desire for palingenetic national purification as well as extreme cruelty against civilians considered traitors to the homeland.

However, though clearly a war of aggression, it was not a guerra celere nor were aerial weapons particularly important. It ended up being a war against civilians, exactly what the Italians had claimed to reject in Spain. Evidently, then, there is no single, pre-defined model of fascist war. English Pages [] Year Now available in paper is Elena Poniatowska's gripping account of the massacre of student protesters by police at t. Faces are all around us and fundamentally shape both everyday experience and our understanding of people.

To lose face i. Using contemporary diaries and letters, mainly translated from Japanese, we follow a group of Nagasaki residents from th. Death in the Afternoon Curfew 1. The Reckoning Who Gave the Order? Assessment of contributions of policies and strategies to entrepreneurship development in micro and small enterprises MSEs in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 91 KB Read more.

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